

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3020  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2006

AIR

DECLASSIFIED  
REF ID: A3-28

FORM-31939  
7h-6-63  
7h-6-130

6 February 1958

Chief, SR  
ATTN: [ ]  
Chief, Munich base

INFO: LR  
OCS/G

PRIORITY

Operational/LC IMPROVE/RSD/ROD/AEBATE

Status of ASCAPELIN-1

References: A. SORM-5525, dated 22 January 1958  
B. MUMI-5213

1. Although ASCAPELIN-1 has been employed by KUBARK more or less steadily in the Munich area since 1946, and although it is known with certainty that the RIB presumes he is AIS employed and that UPWING knows he has contact with KUBARK, it is by no means felt that ASCAPELIN-1 has outlived his usefulness in the Munich area. Although there are obvious security implications inherent in the fact that both the RIB and UPWING are to varying degree aware of his activities, it does not appear that the situation is such as to appreciably lessen ASCAPELIN-1's operational effectiveness, nor does it appear that his overall security position is such as to warrant his removal from the Munich area for security reasons. Munich base is highly desirous that ASCAPELIN-1 remain in Munich; it is known from previous discussions on the subject that ASCAPELIN-1 himself prefers to remain in Munich; and it is doubted that ASCAPELIN-1 could be used as productively by KUBARK at any other station or base at the present time.

NVA 1 IS 6H.23

2. As regards the specifics of ASCAPELIN-1's security position, aside from the fact that anyone who has operated as long as he has in the manner he has must be presumed to be compromised, the following comments would seem to be in order:

a. We have always gone on the assumption that the RIB must know or assume that ASCAPELIN has AIS support. If proof were needed, it was provided in the form of the RIB comments to [ ] during the latter's recent visit to the USCM. [ ] was advised that ASCAPELIN-1 was without doubt an American agent and that although [ ] should not alter his existing relationship with ASCAPELIN-1, he should exercise an appropriate amount of caution in dealing with him. We were at the time, and still are, mildly perplexed that the RIB did not interrogate [ ] more vigorously concerning the full details of his relationship with ASCAPELIN-1. However, one reason may be that the RIB feels that ASCAPELIN-1 is a hopeless case in terms of any operational exploitation and that the best way can do is

DECLASSIFIED

REF ID: A3-28

13	24
013	
15	

SECRET

ECMA-31939  
Page 2

alert those who need to be alerted to AECAPLIN-1's true status. It should be noted that there are numerous other KUBARK assets of interest to the RIE who are probably at least as well known to the RIE as AIS agents. Among these we would number many SEVERAL personalities including Gerald B. Nempot, also [redacted], and earlier [redacted]. There seems to be little doubt that in such a situation the RIE does much as KUBARK would do, namely builds dossiers in an orderly fashion in the hope that some day an opportunity might arise to make a serious approach to the person in question. If the RIE ever should make an approach to AECAPLIN-1, which seems unlikely, we have no doubt that he would handle the approach in a professional and loyal manner.

b. As regards the UPWING involvement, AECAPLIN-1's KUBARK ties were known to UPWING at least as early as 1950. (See ECMA-13088, dated 15 March 1955.) In addition, it must be assumed that UPWING received further confirmation of the extent of AECAPLIN-1's commitment to KUBARK as a result of the misrouted pouch. (ECMA-25832, dated 10 April 1957.) There seems to be little doubt that UPWING is and will remain content to use AECAPLIN-1 on a casual basis, by our leave as it were, as has been the case in the past. We believe UPWING is aware of the fact that AECAPLIN-1 has had a long and close relationship with KUBARK, presumably would assume that AECAPLIN-1 knows where his real future lies, and doubt very much that UPWING would try to work up their present contact with AECAPLIN-1 to any great extent, if for no other reason than the fact that they must assume that AECAPLIN-1 reports on his dealings with UPWING to KUBARK. From our point of view, we also are convinced that if UPWING should try to get any closer to AECAPLIN-1, he would report the fact, without fail, for the reasons noted above as well as several others. One important thing that should be noted, and should be apparent from much of the AECAPLIN-1 operational correspondence in the past year, is that rapport with his present case officer and his regard for KUBARK seems never to have been higher. AECAPLIN-1 himself has written at considerable length on the subject (ECMA-20222, dated 28 August 1956, Att. B; ECMA-30099, dated 25 November 1957; ECMA-30720, dated 15 January 1958, Att. C) and we are convinced that we are on better, closer, more professional terms with AECAPLIN-1 than ever has been the case in the past. Consequently, we are not unduly worried about the possibility that anything might happen that would really threaten his security or his present relationship with KUBARK.

c. It is also worthy of noting that we do not believe that AECAPLIN-1's continued use in which will detract from his long-range usefulness to KUBARK in other parts of the world later in his career. We are quite convinced that, unless the RIE central files are completely destroyed, whenever and wherever AECAPLIN-1 may come to the attention of the RIE, he immediately will be tabbed as an American agent, whether

SECRET

ECMA-31939

Page 3

he is indeed one at the time or not. However, we feel that ARCAPLIN-1, like the many blown intelligence staff officers throughout the world, should be able to cope with this bothersome but surmountable handicap.

3. As regards ARCAPLIN-1's productivity, we feel that his information is still highly valuable, certainly as regards possibilities for local exploitation. Aside from his excellent capability to monitor the activities of the Bandera organization, he has his ear very much to the ground in local Ukrainian circles in general. We strongly feel that ARCAPLIN-1's production of useful and usable C background information and leads is improving and will continue to improve, as should our basic capability for exploiting such information. We have given considerable thought to this problem and believe that, in spite of the security factors noted above, ARCAPLIN-1's access and productivity will, if anything, continue to improve in the future. We have even had the thought that it might be helpful if he were more widely known as an AG agent, in the manner of ALGORILLA. In the case of the latter, aside from the fact that his information gathering potential is considerably increased by the almost universal knowledge that he is an American spy, another dimension is added to the range of operational possibilities. We are thinking of the possibility for unusual CZ activity such as the current [ ] operation.

4. In summary, we would be very loath to give up ARCAPLIN-1 at the present time. We do not feel this is warranted either from the point of view of his productivity or his security situation. We readily admit that in the future his security situation could take a turn for the worse, which does not seem too likely, or that his production and general usefulness might fall off to the extent that his further retention in the Munich area would not be worthwhile. However, we certainly do not believe that such a time is as yet upon us. Therefore, we request that Headquarters reconsider the views expressed in Reference A, and strongly recommend that ARCAPLIN-1 be permitted to remain in the Munich area for a minimum of one more year, at which time his overall situation could again be reviewed.

Distribution:

3 - SR  
2 - SS  
2 - CUG/C

SECRET  
[ ]  
[ ]